The **Project on National Security Reform** (PNSR) is a non-partisan initiative sponsored by the non-profit **Center for the Study of the Presidency** (CSP). PNSR is designed to improve the U.S. Government's ability to effectively provide for the nation's security in the 21st century. To achieve this goal, the United States Government requires comprehensive reform of the regulatory, statutory, and Congressional oversight authorities that govern the interagency system.

The Project on National Security reform seeks to implement a comprehensive and systemic approach to national security reform. Modeled on the historic effort that led to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, PNSR has established twelve working groups to conduct a rigorous examination of the national security system.

Ultimately, PNSR will produce recommendations on changes to the **National Security Act of 1947** and its subsequent amendments, presidential directives to implement reforms, and new Congressional committee structures and practices. Such a broad undertaking will require the involvement of the Executive and Congressional branches of government, public policy institutions, academia, and private foundations.

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Our current national security system, and the manner in which it is governed and funded by Congress, does not permit the timely, effective integration of the diverse departmental expertise and capabilities required to protect the United States, its interests, and its citizens in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. This gives the President a narrow range of options for dealing with national security affairs and causes an over-reliance on the military instrument of national power. Using a blunt and outmoded set of tools, the United States has jeopardized its national security, eroded the nation's image and position in the world, and undermined the trust and confidence of the American people in their government.

This system was devised over sixty years ago for a different era, when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department in overseas missions. With major combat operations and nuclear deterrence the principal focus of US national security strategy, this system required only limited coordination of activities between vertically structured military and civilian departments and agencies. While appropriate for its time, this system did not evolve as the strategic environment around it changed. Consequently, today this system is inadequate for contemporary requirements. As noted in the Center for the Study of the Presidency's study Comprehensive Strategic Reform, "The structures and doctrines the nation developed to win the Cold War have in some cases become weaknesses, many of their assumptions are no longer valid."

Today, national security involves a much wider array of issues that can only be addressed with a broader set of highly synchronized and carefully calibrated capabilities. This is the product of a global environment that is at the same time less structured and more interdependent, making it less amenable to management through conventional military force alone. Overarching common threats and fixed alliances no longer constrain state behavior. States are often less susceptible to diplomatic pressure alone and the United States needs a bigger set of tools to avoid resorting prematurely to major military force. Globalization empowers nonstate actors and individuals to wield influence that is far greater than any other time in human history, while weakening the administrative power of many states to exercise traditional sovereign responsibilities. This makes it imperative that the United States is able to act effectively below the level of a state. The economic and social interdependence of the contemporary global system makes it necessary for the United States to be able to act

globally with great precision; 'collateral damage' is no longer a viable concept. Globalization creates vectors for disease, technology, ideas, and organization that never existed before. These factors combine to create a dynamic, less predictable environment, where issues and geographic areas move rapidly from obscurity to strategic significance and national boundaries are highly permeable. Frequently, the United States will be unable to anticipate the exact capabilities it will require in advance of a crisis, necessitating the ability to rapidly matrix capabilities from different sources. In many instances, the domestic and international divide in the US national security system will hamper the nation's ability to identify and confront threats to security.

The Project on National Security Reform was established to assist the nation as it seeks to better equip itself to meet the national security challenges of the 21st century. The Project will contribute to a better understanding of how the national security arena has changed to include new missions that require a more sophisticated international response. The Project will examine the history of the development of the national security system and how and why it took its current form. The project will then study and define the nature of the problems that inhibit the integration of national power, as well as their causes and the consequences of these problems for national security. Finally, the project will develop an array of possible solutions, evaluate those solutions, and then produce recommendations designed to alleviate these problems. The Project will only advance recommendations supported by analysis and deliberation and will not begin to formulate recommendations until the analytic and deliberative phases are complete.

The Project is focused on the space between the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and Cabinet Secretaries and is not primarily or directly concerned with the internal functioning of departments and agencies. Changes in the relationships between the EOP and the Cabinet Secretaries will necessarily incur changes in the departments and agencies, but this is a long term process that will occur over an extended period of time. The Project on National Security Reform expects that these recommendations will involve substantial regulatory, statutory, and Congressional reforms, to include a new National Security Act, presidential directives to implement changes that do not require prescription in law, and changes to congressional rules governing committee structure and practice to provide sufficient support for and oversight of interagency operations, activities, and programs.

Twenty-one case studies examine enduring problems in interagency operations and their consequences for national security. These case studies inform the work of eight other analytic working groups that are examining different aspects of our national security system and developing recommendations for addressing problems within their respective domains. Three additional groups will take the products from the main analytic working groups and work with Congressional leadership to develop mechanisms for reform; draft legislative proposals, executive orders, and amendments to Senate and House rules; and assist in the implementation of reforms in the Executive Branch.

This Project is focused on reforming the interagency system within which policy and execution are undertaken. It seeks to improve the independent but interrelated methods, rules, structures, principles, human-resources policies and organizations that govern the way in which policy, strategy, planning, resource allocation, implementation, and evaluation take place. The project does not concern itself with the substance of policy, but rather the tools for carrying out policy. A reformed system will not necessarily lead to superior outcomes nor would it be desirable for a reformed system to have any influence on the development or prevention of specific policies. While good leadership is always central to national security, the United States, however, does not have to choose between having either good leadership or a good system. It should seek to have the best of both. A better system will empower

good leaders. No matter how good the leader, an inadequate system will consistently produce suboptimal outcomes.

Study Methodology

Outreach And Problem Definition

At the outset of the project, there will be a concerted effort to reach out to all the different actors who have a role in the national security mission, to include Executive branch departments and agencies and Congressional committees. The project will seek to identify past and current public and private national security reform efforts that it can benefit from or incorporate into its own study plan. During this preliminary stage, the project will identify working group leaders, who will recruit working group members and research fellows. Working group leaders and members of the Executive Secretariat will, in consultation with academics, experts, and practitioners, select a list of case studies that the project will use to identify, illustration, and examine recurring interagency challenges in the U.S. national security system. The leader and members of the Case Studies Working Group will initiate work during this phase of the project. The research fellows, under the supervision of the working group leaders, will conduct literature reviews within the domain of each working group, interview experts in the field, and undertake research in government archives.

The output of this effort will be research papers that outline problems in interagency affairs and causes of these problems within the mandate of each working group. These papers will be presented at a kick off conference July 25-26, which will initiate the study phase of the project. This phase of the project has been funded by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, with contributions from the National Defense University, Institute for Defense Analyses, Science Applications International Corporation, Hudson Institute, Heritage Foundation, Military Professional Resources, Inc., and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as the pro bono participation of numerous private individuals.

Analysis of Deficiencies in the National Security System

This part of the project will involve a major independent, nonpartisan, comprehensive study, which will provide a common analytical framework for understanding the key deficiencies in the interagency component of the U.S. national security system. Each of the study's nine areas will be assigned to a working group via a mandate developed by the Executive Secretariat, at the direction of the Guiding Coalition.

Each working group will use the literature review and problems and causes papers developed in the previous phase of the project to structure its research and analysis, within its mandate. The working groups will begin to develop a full range of alternative solutions, collaborating with other working groups as necessary. They will evaluate and prioritize these alternative solutions.

Developing Mechanisms for Reform

Concurrently with the Analysis of Deficiencies in the National Security System, the project will work with Congressional leadership and staff to identify challenges to interagency national security affairs within Congress—to include oversight, authorization and appropriation processes, committee jurisdiction, House and Senate rules—and propose mechanisms for addressing these challenges. This work will continue through the end of the project.

The Congressional Mechanisms for Reform working group will develop a detailed plan for this phase and will have the overall responsibility for this work, but will be assisted by members of the Guiding Coalition and Executive Secretariat, as well as by the working group on Congressional Oversight.

This component of the project will initially seek to work closely with the leadership and senior staff of four Senate committees and five House committees, all of which directly involve national security affairs.

In later phases, the project will begin to address members from other committees with jurisdictions that address some element of national security.

Each of the analytic working groups will develop briefings for the Congressional Caucus on Interagency Reform, based on the output of the July 2007 conference. The project will be a resource for Congressional leadership if it decides to schedule hearings in the fall of 2007 on the need for interagency reform and on the need for reform to committee jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities.

Formulation of Recommendations

As the working groups move forward with the study, the Executive Secretariat and a Legal Working Group will begin to integrate the different conclusions from the analysis of the other nine working groups and start to bring to fashion recommendations.

The Legal Working Group will determine what existing provisions of United States Code related to the national security system are most relevant for the project's recommendations and will provide suggestions on how to best advance the project's recommendations vis a vis these provisions to the Office of Legislative Counsel in the Senate and House of Representatives, appropriate Senate and House committees with national-security jurisdictions, appropriate White House and National Security Council staff elements, and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the House Committee on Rules. The Legal Working Group will also provide similar suggestions regarding executive orders or other administrative directives, as well as Senate and House Rules.

Support to Implementation Process

The project will support Congressional and Executive branch leadership in acting on any of the project's recommendations. As committees begin consideration of legislation, the project will assist committee by preparing papers and doing research. An effort would also be made to meet with Members of Congress to answer any questions or concerns they may have.

The work on implementation – both of law and executive orders/administrative directives – would be led by the Implementation Working Group, staffed by members of the Executive Secretariat and other working groups. The group would attempt to identify issues of implementation that could have an impact on the content or specificity of recommendations and legal text. It would also identify recommendations with long lead-times where advanced planning would be important. For example, if the Senate and House decided to create a committee to handle interagency affairs, designing a staff and beginning the recruiting process would need to be started early. The group would also formulate a methodology for monitoring and maintaining the reform momentum over time.

Working Groups

The Project includes 12 Working Groups, nine of which conduct research, address challenges, and propose solutions within a specific domain and three of which assist in developing and implementing recommendations. The activities of these working groups are coordinated and integrated by the PNSR Staff. With one exception, each of the study's ten areas is led by a Washington public policy institution. The working group leaders have assembled teams from public policy institutions, universities, business, and government. Selected working group personnel will be made available in 2008 to augment congressional staff considering interagency reform.

Please follow the links below to learn more about the PNSR working groups:

Overarching Issues	**Knowledge Management**
Case Studies	**Resources**
Vision and Guiding Principles	**Congressional Oversight**
Strategy, Policy, & Planning Processes	**Congressional Mechanisms for Reform**
Structure	**Legal Affairs**
Human Capital	**Implementation**

Working Groups

Overarching Issues

Under the direction of **Kori Schake** of the Hoover Institute and the U.S. Military Academy, the **Overarching Issues Working Group** will analyze the 21st century security environment and the new mission areas that flow out of that security environment. This group will review national security reform efforts in other countries and identify approaches that may be of

value to the United States. Together with the PNSR Staff, Overarching Issues will synthesize output from the other working groups and communicate interim findings to the public.

The Overarching Issues working group will explain why now is an opportune time to study and reform the national security system. This discussion will draw from the section of the U.S. National Security Strategy on the need to "Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the 21st Century." Such an explanation will begin by examining historical developments in the particular area being addressed, identifying and analyzing problems, their causes, and their consequences, developing and evaluating a range of alternative solutions for each problem, and recommending solutions that should be adopted and implemented. In performing these tasks, three government levels will be addressed: strategic (Washington), operational (regional), and tactical (country team, U.S. incident scene command, Joint Terrorism Task Force).

To begin its examination of the United States national security apparatus, the Overarching Issues Working Group will conduct a review of the history of the national security system. This history will detail the legal basis for the current organization and functioning of the national security system. Provisions in United States Code will be identified as well as arrangements directed by executive order. Chapter 15, Title 50, dealing with "War and National Defense," prescribes the National Security Council. Whether this is an appropriate title for the NSC, which has much broader responsibilities, will be examined.

After describing the history of the national security system in the United States, the working group will go on to describe the current national security system, including the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, their subordinate committees and groups, and the Office on National Security Program of the Office of Management and Budget. The section will also identify the departments and agencies that contribute to national security and address the use of the lead-agency concept.

In addition to an analysis of the history and current functioning of the national security system, the Overarching Issues Working Group will look at on-going reforms in the national security system: National Security Presidential Directive 44, Department of Defense Directive 3000.5, Quadrennial Defense Review initiatives, Secretary of State's Transformation Diplomacy, Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, and State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The working group will explain the relationship of the Project on National Security Reform to on-going U.S. Government-led reforms.

The membership of the Overarching Issues Working Group is as follows:

- **Ivo Daalder**, The Brookings Institution
- **Frank Miller**, The Cohen Group
- **Steve Flanagan**, National Defense University

Knowledge Management

Knowledge and information are critically important to the work of the national security system. The future security environment will be increasingly complex and dynamic, with security challenges difficult to predict and changing quickly. This will put a premium on rapid communications, easy access to information, enhanced collaboration capabilities, and the rapid dissemination of lessons learned and other forms of knowledge. Managing knowledge

represents an important opportunity for significant improvements in performance and faster, more effective responses. The **Knowledge Management Working Group** will examine the ability of the interagency system and its components to effectively manage the flow of information. It will analyze cultural, structural, and technological obstacles to knowledge management.

Directed by **Irving Lachow** of National Defense University and **David Gompert** of the RAND Corporation, the Knowlege Management Working Group will examine the state of the technology, information technology, and information systems of the NSC and interagency, how they facilitate or hamper improved interagency collaboration, and what on-going reforms are seeking to achieve. It will also examine how departmental systems impact inter-agency cooperation and coalition/international cooperation drawing on case studies to illustrate deficiencies and problems.

The working group will analyze and describe current and future needs for knowledge in formulating and executing national-security policy. The group is tasked with developing technological, infrastructural, organizational, procedural, cultural, and cognitive requirements for knowledge creation, sharing, and use within and among major national security organizations (including Congress and as appropriate allied and international groups). Since the Project on National Security Reform is firmly rooted in the present realities of the national security environment, the Knowledge Management Working Group will also assess the government's ability to meet these requirements at the present time. Finally, the working group will recommend improvements in knowledge access, sharing, protection, and use, consistent with the organizational strategy, structure, processes and personnel recommendations made by other working groups.

To arrive at its recommendations, the working group must examine underlying assumptions of the current national security to determine how its knowledge processes took their current form. Based on this history of knowledge management in the United States government, the working group will then identify the desired level of knowledge access, sharing and use required to improve policy-making and execution, given assumptions about the broader national security structure.

Case Studies

Historical case studies are an essential element of the study and are intended to inform proposals for reforming US government interagency support for national security activities by identifying trends, recurring issues, challenges, solutions and lesson learning to responses to complex operational demands in the past. The following is a list of case studies conducted under the project. Under the direction of James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation and Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute, these case studies have been selected to illustrate the enduring nature of interagency challenges and to explore how the United States responds to crises that have significant non-military dimensions.

- **Response to Influenza (World War I)**
- **War Information (World War II)**
- **Propaganda and Psychological Operations (Cold War)**
- **CORDS in Vietnam**
- **Alaskan Earthquake Recovery Effort**
- **Energy Crisis (1973 and 1979)**
- **Swine Flu Preparations (1976)**
- **Just Cause**

Response to Influenza (World War I)

By John Shortal, Center of Military History

From 1918-1919, the deadliest influenza pandemic in history struck the United States, killing 675,000 out of a population of 105 million. This case study examines the federal government's response, specifically its inability to contain, track, and prevent the spread of the disease. The disease struck in three separate waves, yet each time the federal government failed to develop a coherent strategy to handle the disaster. The emergence of avian influenza demonstrates that such an epidemic remains a possibility. If a similar pandemic were to occur in the United States today, 90 million people would be sick, 45 million would receive out patient care, 10 million would be hospitalized, and two million would die. The study aims to identify and apply the lessons learned from the 1918-1919 pandemic to a discussion of recent legislation on pandemic flu preparedness.

War Information (World War II)

By Nick Sarantakes, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Before and after the United States became a belligerent in the Second World War, the U.S. government was quite active in the realm of information operations. A number of different agencies, cabinet departments, and military services had roles in this area. There was a good deal of overlap between organizations that might at first glance seem to have little to do with communication and information. As a result, it was necessary that these organizations work together for the common good and the war effort. For better or for worse, the various people involved in these issues often defined what was in the best interest of their bureaucracy as also being what was best for the nation at large, and conversely what threatened the institutional interests of their agency was a threat to the well-being of the nation as a whole. The result was a series of bitter confrontations on matters large and small between various elements of the U.S. government. The interagency process among those departments conducting some form of information operations in World War II stands as a pertinent example of interagency misalignment and its consequences.

Propaganda and Psychological Operations (Cold War)

By Carnes Lord, Naval War College

Military psychological operations were at best a marginal feature of US psychological-political activity throughout the Cold War. Handicapped from the start by the distrust of the PSYOP function and its practitioners that was (and remains) widespread in the conventional military, US Army and Air Force PSYOP elements have generally played a modest role in support of US troops on the battlefield and managing civilian populations in combat zones. During the Vietnam War, the peculiar requirements of counterinsurgency warfare led to the creation of a unique organization, the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which brought together military PSYOP and public affairs officers with civilians from USIA and other agencies.

CORDS in Vietnam

By Richard Stewart, Center of Military History

CORDS was an experiment in placing all the interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager but then placing that civilian within the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of MACV. This bold move provided the pacification support effort nearly unfettered access to military resources, personnel, and logistics. CORDS was an innovative attempt to build and operate a truly effective interagency headquarters, blending civilian and military agencies and personnel and directing their focus on one mission: smoothing the flow of U.S. pacification support to the government of South Vietnam.

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Alaskan Earthquake Recovery Effort

By Dwight Ink

On Good Friday, March 27, 1964, the most severe earthquake ever recorded in North America (9.2 on the Richter scale) struck Alaska, damaging over 50,000 square miles and impacting 60% of the state's population. At the time of the disaster, the Civil Rights movement was in full swing and the Cold War nuclear threat was still of great concern to President Johnson, as was the impending Vietnam situation, leaving little room for attention to the reconstruction efforts of the Alaskan infrastructure and economy. However, the unprecedented approaches taken by the President, the unusual leadership role of a senior senator, the strong response of cabinet members, and the unorthodox management strategies developed by career leaders entrusted with directing the rebuilding, combined to produce a successful outcome applauded by the citizenry.

Energy Crisis (1973 and 1979)

By Ben Lieberman, The Heritage Foundation

During the 1970's, the United States experienced two energy crises sparked by the Arab oil embargo in 1973-1974 and by the Iranian revolution in 1978-1979. However, US policy was as much to blame for exacerbating the crises as these exogenous developments were for initiating them. The federal government's newly-created maze of economic and environmental regulations and the agencies implementing them greatly hampered domestic energy supplies and limited the ability to respond to changing events. These contorted efforts contributed to America's energy crises instead of alleviating them, an actuality that should be examined and considered in the development of future energy policies.

Swine Flu Preparations (1976)

By John O'Shea

Just Cause

By Scott Kofmehl, Georgetown University

On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded Panama, an action codenamed "Operation Just Cause". While the combat operations were largely successful (removed Noriega from power and extradited him to the U.S. for trial) and relatively quick (combat operations concluded after three weeks), the post-conflict operations in Panama lacked the comparable strategic clarity, resource commitment, and policy priority. From the initial contingency plans created in the spring of 1988 through the invasion in December 1989, U.S. policy towards Panama focused on Noriega's removal, not considering what came after his departure. Throughout the U.S. national security apparatus, post-conflict planning was bifurcated from and subordinated to the combat planning, which translated directly into a lack of strategic vision and operational and tactical neglect in post-conflict operations.

War on Drugs (1988-)

Iran/Contra Operations

By Alex Douville, Director of Policy Studies, Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Reagan Administration took for granted the power of the President and his Executive Branch as sole executor of U.S. foreign policy. Due to the President's leadership style and the passage of legislation like the Boland Amendments, which limited funding and restricted covert operations, power not only to develop but to execute policy was shifted from the historic power brokers, the heads of the Departments of State and Defense, to the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the NSC staff. Consequently, inexperienced entities with fluid command structures and untested authority were tasked with developing and carrying out the President's foreign policies. The ramifications stemming from this led directly to the Iran-Contra affair, which heavily impacted the national security system in the United States.

Bosnia and Kosovo

By Vicki Rast, Air Force Academy

The transformed geopolitical context of the twenty-first century demands a Goldwater-Nichols—type restructuring of the US Government's (USG) policy-making process. Created via a process wherein each of the executive departments is represented, national security policy development remains artificially compartmentalized despite an interagency process structured to achieve synergistic effects. Too often the USG has lacked proper crisis analysis in addressing foreign affairs concerns. This deficiency consequently affects the ability to form strategic vision and integrate planning processes. Analysis of two 1990s cases—Bosnia and Kosovo—demonstrates the inability of the current interagency process to promulgate national security intervention policy effectively.

Ottawa Convention and Landmines

By Dennis Barlow, James Madison University

Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998)

By Roz Engel, United States Military Academy at West Point

Y2K "The Millennium Bug" (1999)

East Timor Crisis

By Richard Weitz, The Hudson Institute

Scholars and historians offer conflicting appraisals of US-Australian interactions during the 1999 East Timor crisis. Following the new Indonesian president's unexpected decision in early 1999 to allow the East Timorese to vote on whether to remain part of Indonesia or become independent, both the US and Australia agreed on the need for a concerted effort to secure a free, fair, and peaceful referendum. They disagreed, however, on how best to implement their shared policy. After a week of public bickering, however, the two sides worked out a division of labor for a military intervention that, combined with their joint political and especially economic initiatives, overcame these tensions. The success in East Timor in turn helped pave the way for the even deeper U.S.-Australian military cooperation that developed after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 and Bali in 2002.

Response to 9/11 and Global War on Terror (2001-2003)

Laos

By Robert Killebrew et al.

Anthrax

By John O'Shea, The Heritage Foundation

Post Conflict Afghanistan and Iraq

Tsunami Relief

By Gary Anderson, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

The 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean spawned a massive global humanitarian response. Various issues arose associated with the transition from relief to reconstruction in four countries which were the primary recipients of U.S. relief efforts (Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives). This case study is divided into a historical summary of the disaster, a general discussion on humanitarian relief operations, challenges associated with international interagency coordination, U.S. interagency issues, and observations on potential lessons learned and recommended improvements.

Response to Katrina

By John Brinkerhoff, Institute for Defense Analysis

The consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the failure of the levees protecting New Orleans constitute the worst natural disaster ever in the United States. The FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina has been described as a failure. Press accounts and current conventional wisdoms label FEMA as incompetent, unprepared, and unable to deal well with the effects of two hurricanes that hit the Gulf Coast and a flood in New Orleans that occurred in August 2005. In fact, the FEMA response was proactive, well organized, and well done in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and most of Louisiana. This case study examines one facet of the overall effort, which is the response phase that lasted twelve days from 26 August 2005 to 6 September 2005. The case study is also limited by addressing only the FEMA roles in the response operation and focusing on how well the National Response Plan (NRP) served as a process for coordinating Federal efforts.

Resources

The **Resources Working Group** is tasked with analyzing the resource allocation process for funding national instruments of power, with special attention to the role of the Office of

Management and Budget. It also addresses foreign emergency relief, military, and developmental assistance mechanisms.

To complete its work, the Resources Working Group must distinguish between funding for operations, both military and civilian, and funds for foreign assistance (bilateral and multilateral). On the one hand, the working group will examine funding for operations, both military and civilian. Issues will include congressional requirements and procedures, calculation of needed funding, use of funds (especially through contractors), and accounting. On the other hand, the working group will focus on the interagency element of how the U.S. Government spends money on humanitarian aid, development assistance, military assistance, and support to multilateral organizations (United Nations, World Bank, Organization of American States, etc.).

As a whole, the Resources Working Group will analyze the U.S. Government's resource allocation process: how fiscal guidance is prepared, how funds are allocated across missions and departments, how funds are requested, questions of timing, and oversight. It will especially look at the resource-allocation role of the Office of National Security Programs of the Office of Management and Budget. OMB's mission statement describes its resource role as: "OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding priorities." There is no mention in the mission statement of outputs.

In addition, the working group will examine congressional requirements and procedures, calculation of needed funding, use of funds (especially through contractors), and accounting. From this examination of the current funding process of the national security instrument, the working group will go on to recommend resource allocation reforms consistent with the organizational strategy, structure, processes and personnel recommendations made by other working groups.

Vision & Guiding Principles

The **Vision and Guiding Principles Working Group** will describe a "vision of success in the year 2030" for the national security system and work backwards from that vision to develop Guiding Principles that will set the framework for decision making for the Project and the ultimate legislative solution.

Organizational theorists suggest that agreement on a vision, purpose, and principles is the most important element in organizational effectiveness. Directed by Sheila Ronis of the University Group and Walsh College, The Vision and Guiding Principles Working Group will examine whether such agreement exists across the national security system, paying particular attention to the intersection of military doctrine and internal procedures used by each department and agency to guide activities in national security affairs. Have the highest authorities in the national security system articulated a government-wide vision, purpose, and set of principles? To what extent has such an articulation unified departmental thinking and action or, on the other hand, to what extent has the failure to articulate such a vision led to departmental fragmentation and policy gridlock? How do the principles of various departments align with or contradict each other? How have they been formulated, disseminated, received and, in some cases, changed?

If a common set of principles does not exist throughout the whole system, the working group will develop a common national security vision, sense of purpose and guiding principles that

accounts for the need to achieve unity of effort and an appropriate division of labor among proposed national security organizations.

The Vision and Guiding Principles Working Group benefits from the contributions of the following working group members:

- **Robert Polk**, Institute for Defense Analysis
- **Daniel Langberg**, Institute for Defense Analysis
- **Patti Benner,** Office of the Secretary of DefenseErik Kjonnerod, Interagency Transformation, Education, and Analysis, National Defense University
- **David Leech**, Northrop Grumman Information Technology Intelligence Group, TASC
- **Christopher Waychoff**, Northrop Grumman Information Technology Intelligence Group, TASC
- **Joseph Gueron**, Chief, Information Policy and Administration Division, USAID

In addition, the Vision and Guiding Principles Working Group has one research fellow:

- **Ian Grant**, Georgetown University

Congressional Oversight

Directed by **Charles A. Stevenson** of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at John's Hopkins University, the **Working Group on Congressional Oversight** is charged with determining the current role of Congress and its various committees in supporting and overseeing the national security system, examining other oversight mechanisms such as the Government Accountability Office and internal department and agency inspector-generals, and then recommending congressional and other oversight changes consistent with the organizational strategy, structure, processes and personnel recommendations made by other working groups. It is examining apparent problems rooted in structural, procedural, financial, political, conceptual, and institutional factors.

At present, Congress has limited interaction with the national security system because of its placement in the Executive Office of the President. This chapter will examine the continued appropriateness of that approach. Congress appears to inhibit interagency collaboration and reinforces interagency divisions by its exclusive focus on the authorities and budgets of departments and agencies. Although Congress will remain the key oversight component, this working group will examine other oversight mechanisms. These might include internally (such as inspector-generals), judicially, and through Congress (i.e., Government Accountability Office).

In the process of meeting its objectives, the Congressional Oversight Working Group must examine the history and underlying assumptions of the current national security system's oversight to determine how it took its current form. In so doing, the working group will be able to identify problems with the current system, their causes, and their consequences. From this point, the working group will move to identify prerequisites for a successful system of national security oversight, isolate critical impediments for success, and develop a full range of alternative solutions. From this process, the Congressional Oversight Working Group will

derive its recommendations regarding the creation of a fully functional and improved national security system.

Members of the Congressional Oversight Working Group are:

- Rodney Bent
- Janet Breslin
- Derek Chollet
- Michelle Gavin
- Bob Goldich
- Scott Lilly
- Denis McDonough
- Randy Scheunemann
- Pat Towell
- Kim Wincup

Strategy, Policy, & Planning Processes

Led by **Daniel Gerstein** of Military Professional Resources, Inc. and **Kathleen Hicks** of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Strategy, Policy, and Planning Processes Working Group will examine key processes used to formulate strategy, policy, and plans. In the planning process, it will examine both deliberate planning and crisis-action planning.

Strategic planning involves defining major objectives and developing strategies to reach those objectives. **General Brent Scowcroft** identified strategic planning as the National Security Council's key deficiency. Here, the working group will focus on the strategic planning and strategy development processes from the working level to the Oval Office, identifying their strengths and weaknesses.

To carry out its mission, the Strategy, Policy, and Planning Processes Working group will examine the history and underlying assumptions of the current national security system's processes to determine how they took their current form. Next, the working group will develop a common framework for future interagency processes by defining desired attributes of strategy, policy and planning and the relationships among them. Finally, the working group will make recommendations regarding both the strategy and policy development and execution process.

In evaluating execution processes, the Strategy, Policy, and Planning Processes Working Group will deal with two main elements: immediate execution following a presidential decision and longer-term implementation and tracking of developments. Under this directive, the working group will examine the existing civil and military logistical, financial, and administrative systems that support operations. It will look at internal reviews of operations and lessons learned processes.

The Strategy, Policy, and Planning Processes Working Group will seek to determine the extent to which strategy and policy drive actual department and agency plans and performance for both the short and long term. Similarly, the working group will assess the extent to which performance feedback modifies plans. The working group must determine whether departments and agencies are equipped with logistical, financial, administrative, and reporting systems that enable them to implement strategies and plans. To the extent such support is available, are the systems similar enough to allow collaboration on multi-agency

contingencies? In addition, the working group will assess the extent to which the U.S. government is able to learn from actual national security experiences and make those lessons readily available.

What is the ability of the interagency process to produce an integrated plan for the full range of activities required for conducting interagency operations? Problems in the response to Hurricane Katrina show deficiencies in the National Response Plan and the inadequacy of complementary planning at state and local levels. This working group will examine the various departmental and interagency approaches to planning – in terms of methodology, training and skills required – for both deliberate planning and crisis-action planning.

The working group will also deal with the existing systems – logistical, financial, administrative, risk-related -- to support operations, especially by civilian departments and agencies, and how the different systems pose problems for multi-agency deployments. It will examine the extent to which the national security system has effectively harnessed technology, communication systems, and information systems.

All successful organizations review their approaches at regular intervals and seek to learn lessons from past experiences. This working group will focus on how the U.S. Government does so, especially on issues of interagency concern. Different departmental approaches will be contrast and the frequency and quality of multi-agency reviews examined.

Congressional Mechanisms for Reform

Concurrently with the Analysis of Deficiencies in the National Security System, the project will work with Congressional leadership and staff to identify challenges to interagency national security affairs within Congress—to include oversight, authorization and appropriation processes, committee jurisdiction, House and Senate rules—and propose mechanisms for addressing these challenges. This work will continue through the end of the project.

The **Congressional Mechanisms for Reform Working Group** will develop a detailed plan for this phase and will have the overall responsibility for this work, but will be assisted by members of the Guiding Coalition and PNSR Staff, as well as by the working group on Congressional Oversight.

This component of the project will initially seek to work closely with the leadership and senior staff of four Senate committees and five House committees, all of which directly involve national security affairs. In later phases, the project will begin to address members from other committees with jurisdictions that address some element of national security.

Structure

Directed by **Christopher J. Lamb** of National Defense University, the **Structure Working Group** assesses the importance of organizational structure for ensuring effective integration of all elements of national power, primarily through the means of interagency collaboration. The overarching goal is to identify structural problems that impede interagency collaboration and best solutions to those problems.

The Structure Working Group is examining the importance of organizational structure for producing desired national security outcomes, and how structure relates to other parts of the

Project's study effort. The Group is conducing a thorough review of literature on national security structure to determine, inter alia, the current organizational structure of the national security apparatus, how it has evolved, and the effects of past structural adjustments and whether they accomplished their purported objectives. The Group is also examining trends in organizational theory and practice to determine the importance of structure for explaining organizational performance, and how optimal structure depends on factors such as the organization's strategy for producing desired output, the nature of the desired output, and the operating environment.

In the course of its work, the Structure Working Group has a number of important objectives. To begin, the working group must determine the importance of structure as a component part of organizational design in general and for national security organization in particular. More specifically, the working group must determine the extent to which current structure (or its absence) contributes to departments and agencies failing to cooperate and achieve unity of effort. Once this is determined, the working group will go on to identify options that would best solve the core structural problems, and the extent to which they might solve peripheral ones as well. Finally, the working group will accomplish these objectives for the national, regional, and country levels of national security organization and account for collaboration with allies and U.S. state and local governments.

The Structure Working Group is organized around six teams. One team, currently led by Dr. Lamb, is examining organizational theory and practice as it relates to structure, and the other teams are organized topically around national, regional, country, multilateral and state and local structures related to national security. The other study team leaders are:

- National-Level Team – **Dr. Kori Schake** (Hoover Institution)
- Regional-Level Team – **Fred Frostic** (Booz Allen Hamilton)
- Country-Level Team – **Ambassador (Retired) Robert Oakley** (Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University)
- State/Local Issue Team – **Dr. Paul Posner** (George Mason University)
- Multilateral Issue Team – **Ambassador (Retired) Edward Marks & Kara McDonald** (National Security Council)

Research Fellows assisting the Structure Working Group and its issue teams are:

- Multilateral Issue Team – **Lisa Andivahis**
- Regional-Level Issue Team – **Ben Mallory**
- Structure Working Group Overall – **Barbara McCarthy**
- National-Level Issue Team and Research Fellow Coordinator – **Matthew Shabat**
- Organizational Structure Research and Project News Manager – **Rei Ulysses Tang**
- Country-Level Issue Team – **Adam Vaccaro**

Legal Affairs

Headed by **Gordon Lederman** of the Council on Foreign Relations, the **Legal Affairs Working Group** is responsible for determining legal impediments to interagency integration, generating solutions to those impediments, and translating the Project's recommendations into a draft National Security Act, Executive Orders, and Congressional resolutions. The

working group is critical for ensuring that legal impediments to interagency integration are resolved and that the Project's final product submitted to the Congress and the Executive Branch and released to the public is specific and actionable – with draft text for consideration and adoption by the Congress and the Executive Branch.

The Legal Affairs Working Group is organized in three main parts. The Legal Research Team is responsible for conducting legal research on various topics related to interagency integration. The Working Groups Liaison Team is responsible for ensuring collaboration with the other working groups. The Outreach Team is responsible for maintaining the Legal Advisory Board and arranging interviews with current and former government attorneys and other key individuals.

The Legal Affairs Working Group chair and the heads of each team constitute the Core Team. The Legal Advisory Board provides strategic advice to the Core Team and also reviews the work of the legal research team. Finally, a Scenario Team is responsible for drafting scenarios of interagency integration for use in the July 2007 conference.

The Legal Affairs Working Group intends to work in a close, collaborative manner with the other working groups. The findings of the other working groups will help set the Legal Affairs agenda, as the Legal Affairs Working Group will investigate whether problems identified by the other working groups have a legal basis. In addition, Legal Affairs will be responsible for determining whether recommendations generated by the working groups have legal implications. Finally, the Legal Affairs Working Group will translate the working groups' recommendations into statutory and regulatory language. Among other things, Legal Affairs will draft an outline of a National Security Act, with the intention that the outline will serve to crystallize various issues related to the Project's recommendations.

In preparation for the July conference, the Legal Affairs Working Group reviewed the case studies completed to date and also the Project's recommended background reading. The working group developed a list of 14 legal research questions, and the working group's researchers are examining those questions. The Legal Affairs Working Group is also drafting scenarios picturing ideal interagency integration for use at the conference to generate discussion about potential legal issues.

The Legal Affairs Working Group benefits fromt the committment of a core team of individuals:

- Wendy Reid, Esq., Director of Legal Research
- Rich Love, Esq., Director of Working Groups Liaison
- Frank Mirkow, Esq., Director of Outreach
- Prof. Gerry Gingrich, Senior Advisor on Transformation
- David Fauvre, Esq., Director of Logistics

In addition to the core team, the Legal Affairs Working Group employs a research team, comprised of the following people:

- Garret Artz, NCCU Law School
- Craig Berry, American University Law School
- Rebekah L. Bina, Esq., Shulman Rogers Gandal Pordy & Ecker, P.A.
- Frank (Gus) Biggio, Esq., Morrison & Foerster LLP
- Sukhi Brar, Esq., CA Fair Political Practices Commission
- Cody Brown, Georgetown, LLM Candidate

- David N. Fagan, Esq., Covington & Burling LLP, stewarding several Covington summer associates
- Alexandra Harrington, Esq., Private practice
- Jennifer Kamorowski, Esq., USN Reserve
- Stephen I. Landman, Catholic University Law School
- Martha K. Plante, American University Law School

The Legal Advisory Board for the Legal Affairs Working Group is as follows:

- Prof. Harvey Rishikoff, Esq., National Defense University
- Prof. John Norton Moore, Esq., UVA Law School
- Prof. Robert Chesney, Esq., Wake Forest Law School
- Prof. Scott Silliman, Esq., Duke Law School

Finally, the Legal Affairs Working Group Scenario Team consists of:

- Neal Pollard, Esq.
- Richard Nelson

Human Capital

Headed by **Ambassador Gary Matthews** of the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP), the **Human Capital Working Group** will assess the relative importance of good leadership and well-trained and educated staff for producing desired organizational output and outcomes in general and for national security organizations in particular. Deeply involved in the issue of skilled national security professionals, the Human Capital Working Group will analyze current requirements for national security organizations to train and educate their personnel, and whether education and training (including simulations and exercises) is linked to specific skill sets. The working group will then identify requirements and opportunities for education and training relevant to interagency policy and operations at all levels.

This Human Capital Working Group will look at the U.S. Government's staff – from civil/foreign servants through administrative staff to military personnel – to see what skills are currently being required, what on-going learning is being offered or required and how this supports interagency policy and operations at all levels. The working group will also look at the training – as opposed to education – that government staff is given both before operations and through the course of their careers. It will specifically examine the government's use of exercises to prepare for national security operations.

The Human Capital Working Group will examine how the role of leadership – presidential, departmental and mid-level – facilitates or obstructs interagency work. It will also look at management – skills and systems – in departments to understand how this contributes to, or undermines, interagency work.

Closely related to the above is the issue of institutional culture and how it is created and sustained and contributes to an interagency approach. Every organization has a distinct culture just as each individual has a different personality. The Human Capital Working Group will describe the culture of the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the departments and agencies that contribute to national security. It will also identify how these different cultures affect interagency performance. In addition, it is important to examine whether departments and agencies that contribute to national security have the core

competencies (organization skills) to be effective participants in interagency preparations and operations.

The overarching goal of the Working Group on Human Capital is to investigate the critical function human capital plays in the interagency system and to examine the importance of leadership, at multiple levels, in guiding national security organizations. The Working Group will devise a set of recommendations aimed at increasing the efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, interoperability and cross-organizational understanding of personnel operating at the interagency level. These recommendations will specifically address key issues affecting personnel management in the current national security structure, the role that leaders play in overcoming or exacerbating interagency coordination problems, and the existence of known impediments to a national security personnel system that would reward rather than punish interagency collaboration.

The following people contribute to the Human Capital Working Group:

- **Ambassador Robert L. Barry**
- **Ambassador Donald Hays**
- **Ambassador Pamela H. Smith**
- **Ms. Myra Shiplett, SES (Retired)**
- **Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley**
- **Dr. Thomas Kirlin**
- **Mr. Ysbrant A. Marcelis**
- **Ms. Limor Ben-Har**

The following research fellows contribute to the Human Capital Working Group:

- **Mr. Brian Ellison**
- **Mr. Nicholas G. Lesher**
- **Mr. Erich C. Schwarz**

Implementation

The Project on National Security Reform will support Congressional and Executive branch leadership in acting on any of the project's recommendations. As committees begin consideration of legislation, the project will assist committee by preparing papers and doing research. An effort would also be made to meet with Members of Congress to answer any questions or concerns they may have.

The work on implementation – both of law and executive orders/administrative directives – would be led by the **Implementation Working Group**, staffed by members of the Executive Secretariat and other working groups. The group will attempt to identify issues of implementation that could have an impact on the content or specificity of recommendations and legal text. It would also identify recommendations with long lead-times where advanced planning would be important. For example, if the Senate and House decided to create a committee to handle interagency affairs, designing a staff and beginning the recruiting process would need to be started early. The group will also formulate a methodology for monitoring and maintaining the reform momentum over time.

Products

The project's principal products will be a published version of its study, draft of the National Security Act of 2008, draft executive orders and administrative directives, and a proposal for congressional reform. The study will be published in sufficient quantity to ensure that each executive and legislative branch official with a role in deciding and implementing these reforms will have a copy. Implementation is fifty percent of the reform effort, and communication is a key tool for inspiring effective implementation. Tens of thousands of government personnel, in the administration and Congress, would need to contribute if implementation is to succeed. The study would show this large group the need for and wisdom of reforms. Consideration will also be given to awareness-raising events (lectures, on-line information, and incorporation of information into human-resources documents).

The project will also publish short papers on research done for the study and papers prepared for Congress

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